The Planet on Trial: Ukraine’s Case for Ecocide in the Russo-Ukrainian War
Kherson After the Destruction of Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. State Emergency Service of Ukraine. 2023
By Maria Marcelino, University of California, Berkeley
I. Introduction: Ecocide and the Russo-Ukrainian War
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has brought renewed attention to environmental crimes. One of the most salient examples is the partial destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023, which caused catastrophic flooding, displaced tens of thousands, and threatened water supplies and agriculture in southern Ukraine. The environmental influences are serious, with altered hydrology, contamination of drinking water, and long-term ecosystem disruption. The scale of ecological destruction in Ukraine has garnered international concern, but prosecuting these crimes under the notion of “ecocide” faces significant hurdles despite a long history of efforts to include environmental destruction in international law.
The Vietnam War marked an important precedent in understanding environmental warfare and its consequences. The concept of ecocide gained prominence during the “War Crimes and the American Conscience” conference in February 1970, introduced by Arthur W. Galston. This conference highlighted the growing awareness of the long-term ecological consequences of warfare. Galston’s efforts culminated in President Gerald Ford issuing Executive Order 11850, formally renouncing the use of herbicides in war in 1975. The success of this campaign not only altered U.S. military policy but also contributed to the more expansive international discourse on environmental warfare and its consequences. In 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), ratified by the USSR the following year. In 1990, Vietnam became the first nation to integrate the concept of ecocide into its criminal code, prosecuting “individuals who commit acts of ecocide or destroy the natural environment.” Since then, around a dozen countries have adopted similar provisions, particularly those in the former USSR, such as Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, and notably Russia.
However, the protocol’s limitations soon became apparent. While it prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, several major powers reserved the right to use these weapons for retaliatory purposes. Furthermore, the protocol failed to address the production, storage, testing, and transfer of these weapons, allowing countries to amass substantial stockpiles. As a result, ecocide, defined as "a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment," by the Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide is not currently recognized as a war crime and This definition is a start to understand the environmental consequences in the Russo-Ukrainian War while highlighting challenges for its prosecution under existing international law.
II. Environmental Impact
Military actions in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war significantly affect landscapes and habitats. One of the most severe impacts is the contamination of soil and water resources. Over 200,000 hectares of Ukrainian land are currently contaminated with debris, mines, and shells. As a result, Ukraine has become one of the world’s most heavily mined countries, with explosive objects contaminating natural landscapes and agricultural lands. Demining efforts are ongoing, with thousands of explosive items removed daily. However, forests may remain mined for decades, impacting wildlife and ecosystem recovery. The use of outdated Soviet military equipment, which runs on harmful propellants, has led to immediate and long-lasting soil contamination. The chemical compounds in these propellants, along with spills of fuel and lubricants from exploded vehicles, have resulted in high concentrations of heavy metals in the soil. This contamination poses a threat to human health and agricultural productivity, with experts predicting that it may take decades for Ukraine to restore its food production capabilities.
The destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 was a significant event in this conflict. The dam, located in the Russian-occupied territory along the front line in southern Ukraine, was partially destroyed on June 6, 2023. The dam, built in the 1950s, was a crucial piece of infrastructure on the Dnipro River. It served multiple purposes, including hydroelectric power generation, irrigation for agricultural lands, and water supply for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Its destruction released an enormous volume of water, causing immediate and severe flooding downstream. Soil and water contamination are omnipresent, with over 200,000 hectares of land affected by debris, mines, and harmful chemical residues from destroyed military equipment, putting communities at a heightened risk of cancers, neurological disorders, and other severe health issues. Seismic analysis conducted by Norwegian experts provided evidence of an explosion, suggesting deliberate destruction rather than structural failure. U.S. media reported that spy satellites also detected an explosion around the same time. The dam’s collapse affected aquatic life and potentially contaminated drinking water sources for millions of people. Long-term consequences are expected to include altered hydrology, ecosystem disruption, groundwater impacts, and a legacy of contamination. The destruction also had significant humanitarian and economic repercussions, including the displacement of thousands of people, agricultural losses, infrastructure damage, and water supply issues.
Both Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of causing the destruction. Ukraine claimed it was a deliberate war crime committed by Russia, while Russia blamed Ukraine, suggesting it was an attempt to distract from a supposedly ineffective counter-offensive. Experts believe the partial destruction was likely a deliberate act rather than an accident, despite the dam’s water levels having risen dangerously high in the months prior. They suggest it would have been easier to destroy the dam from the inside than from the outside, implying Russian involvement, given their control of the area for 15 months. The destruction of the dam has had legal implications. As an occupying force, Russia’s actions are governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically Article 53, which prohibits the destruction of property under certain circumstances during occupation. Article 53 prohibits an Occupying Power from destroying property in occupied territories, with a crucial exception for cases where “such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”
The long-term implications are equally severe. The reduction in the reservoir’s water level threatens the viability of crucial canal systems that supply water to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as Crimea. This disruption poses a threat to agricultural productivity in one of the world’s most important food-producing regions, as Ukraine itself is known as the “breadbasket of Europe.” In addition to this, the flooding has compromised access to clean drinking water for numerous towns and villages along the Dnipro River. The potential contamination of water sources with sewage raises the specter of waterborne diseases, particularly in Russian-occupied areas where healthcare infrastructure may be scarce.
The application of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Kakhovka dam incident requires an assessment of whether the destruction was "absolutely necessary by military operations.” Beyond potential violations of Article 53, the act may contravene Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, which protects dams and similar installations from attacks that could cause severe civilian losses, even when considered military objectives. Essentially, this article prohibits attacks on such installations, even for military objectives, if the attack may cause severe losses among the civilian population. The European Parliament has condemned the destruction of the Kakhovka dam as a war crime, emphasizing that such acts can generate individual criminal responsibility under international law. While these provisions focus primarily on civilian harm and military necessity, the scale and ecological consequences of the dam’s destruction demonstrate the intersection with the concept of ecocide. The deliberate or reckless destruction of essential environmental infrastructure during armed conflict shows how environmental devastation can compound human suffering and biodiversity loss, accentuating the need to recognize ecocide as an independent international crime.
A long-term concern coming from the dam’s destruction is its potential impact on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Even though the reactors are currently shut down and cooled by isolated retention basins and spray ponds, the reduced river level increases the risk of basin leakage or even structural compromise of the surrounding dike. If such damage were to occur, emergency measures would be required to maintain cooling capacity, which is essential to prevent overheating of the reactors and avoid a potential nuclear accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Ukrainian nuclear authorities are closely monitoring this situation. In the context of Ukraine’s nuclear history, the Chernobyl disaster stands as a historical event that has shaped the country’s approach to nuclear safety and environmental crises.
III. Historical and Legal Context of Ecocide
Recognizing ecocide as an international crime under the ICC would require an amendment to the Rome Statute, a process that demands broad international consensus and is therefore extremely difficult to achieve. To include ecocide as a fifth crime, the Rome Statute would need to be amended, a process that requires significant international consensus and can take years to complete. It would require a proposal from a state party, followed by negotiations among all state parties to arrive at a final amendment text. The adoption of the amendment would then require either consensus or a two-thirds majority vote at an Assembly of States Parties. Even if adopted, individual states would need to ratify the amendment, and it would only come into effect one year after ratification.
The ICC’s jurisdiction is generally limited to crimes committed on the territory of member states or by their nationals unless the UN Security Council refers a situation to the ICC. Given Russia’s permanent member status and veto power in the Security Council, such a referral is unlikely. The current framework of international criminal law is also not well-suited to address environmental crimes. The existing crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction are primarily anthropocentric, focusing on harm to humans rather than the environment itself. While there is a provision in the Rome Statute, Article 8(2) (b) (iv), that criminalizes certain environmental damage during armed conflict, its threshold is extremely high and limited to international armed conflicts. This provision has also never been successfully applied in practice.
The ICC’s principle of complementarity would further complicate ecocide prosecution, a principle where the Court acts only when national jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to prosecute crimes. Since Russia has a competent judicial system, complementarity could be invoked to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction over alleged environmental crimes, even if ecocide were recognized as a fifth war crime.
The ICC Prosecutor has launched a formal investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Concurrently, there are ongoing international efforts to establish a special tribunal specifically for prosecuting the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The United States, in collaboration with allies and partners, is supporting Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) by providing resources and coordinating accountability efforts. The OPG has prosecuted and secured convictions for a small number of alleged crimes, given the ongoing armed conflict. Some trials have been conducted in absentia, and many convicted Russian soldiers have been exchanged as part of prisoner-of-war swaps.
IV. Ukraine’s Legal Strategies and Documentation
To gain a better understanding of Ukraine’s approach to environmental documentation during the war, I spoke with UC Berkeley Professor Nataliia Goshylyk, an expert in Ukrainian history. She emphasized that Ukraine’s historical experience with ecological disasters has deeply influenced its current practices. "Ukraine’s historical experience with environmental disasters, particularly the Chornobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and the industrial pollution of the Soviet era, has shaped its environmental awareness and, consequently, its approach to documenting the ecological damage caused by Russia’s invasion," Goshylyk explained. She highlighted that Ukraine has long been aware of the severe environmental degradation, having lived through one of the world’s worst nuclear catastrophes and the lingering effects of Soviet industrial pollution. Professor Goshylyk further elaborated on Ukraine’s current systematic documentation efforts: "In response to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has applied existing capabilities to document the war’s ecological impact, from the destruction of forests and agricultural lands to water pollution. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources and various NGOs have been actively tracking and quantifying the damage. Ukraine is collecting data on toxic spills, chemical leaks, and the destruction of critical ecosystems caused by military activities, much like the systematic data gathering after Chernobyl."
She also noted the strategic dimension of this documentation in relation to international legal accountability. "A key strategic shift in Ukraine’s approach lies in the legal realm. Unlike previous environmental disasters, which were largely internal or regional matters, the current war opens the door for Ukraine to pursue international legal claims for reparations against Russia. Ukraine aims to build a comprehensive case for future legal actions in international courts, including claims under environmental law or wartime compensation frameworks."
This documentation could also play a crucial role in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts, enabling international organizations, donors, and courts to assess the scope of ecological restoration required. For instance, Ukraine has submitted preliminary reports to the United Nations, citing widespread damage to water supplies, natural reserves, and agricultural lands. The emphasis on transparency and international engagement mirrors Ukraine's post-Chernobyl collaboration with global entities like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It highlights a shift toward utilizing environmental damage as a key aspect of its broader strategy for legal accountability. By leveraging its historical experience in environmental disasters, Ukraine is responding to immediate war-related damage and laying the groundwork for long-term ecological recovery and potential legal redress.
V. Potential Pathways for Ukraine to Hold Russia Accountable
By systematically gathering evidence of ecological harm, Ukraine is building a robust case for potential legal actions against Russia in international courts. However, it’s important to recognize that this war is still occurring as of 2024, with new information coming out daily. This continuous nature of the war means that the environmental destruction is ongoing and cumulative. For instance, as of July 2023, there were 2,450 reports of military actions with direct environmental effects, resulting in an estimated €52.,4 billion euros in environmental damage. However, these figures are likely outdated by the time they are published, as the situation evolves quickly. This evolving nature also means that some areas remain inaccessible for thorough assessment. Ongoing hostilities prevent experts from conducting on-site investigations in many regions, forcing reliance on remote monitoring and satellite imagery. This limitation may result in underestimating the true scale of environmental degradation, especially in active conflict zones. Moreover, certain environmental impacts may not be immediately apparent. Long-term effects on biodiversity, soil contamination, and water quality can take months or years to fully manifest. The release of toxic substances from damaged industrial facilities, for example, may have far-reaching consequences that are not fully understood or documented.
The war also complicates efforts to mitigate environmental damage. Resources that could be allocated to environmental protection and restoration are instead diverted to immediate humanitarian needs and defense. This delay in addressing environmental issues could exacerbate long-term ecological problems. However, the continuous flow of new information also provides opportunities for more comprehensive documentation. As Ukraine and international partners refine their monitoring techniques and expand their reach, they can build an increasingly detailed picture of the war’s environmental toll. This evolving body of evidence will be crucial for future restoration efforts and potential legal actions against Russia for environmental crimes. There are current measures being implemented to mitigate the environmental damage being caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine’s pyrotechnic units are conducting extensive demining efforts, removing and defusing up to 6,000 explosive items daily, which significantly reduces contamination of natural landscapes.
Historical precedent from the Nuremberg Trials continues to inform the prosecution of international crimes, including in Ukraine. The trials established frameworks for addressing war crimes, categories directly relevant to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and guiding contemporary legal efforts to hold perpetrators accountable. In light of ongoing conflicts with the Russo-Ukrainian war, where allegations of ecocide and war crimes are prevalent, revisiting the Nuremberg trials is essential. Prosecuting Russia for its actions in Ukraine requires an approach that leverages both innovative legal frameworks and international cooperation. A hybrid international tribunal would amalgamate elements of international criminal law with domestic legal principles, thereby facilitating its operation within Ukraine while adhering to established norms of international jurisprudence.
The tribunal could be established via a resolution from the United Nations General Assembly, which would provide legitimacy and support from the international community. Because the ICC contains jurisdictional limitations, the proposed hybrid tribunal would circumvent these restrictions by explicitly defining its jurisdiction over acts committed during the ongoing conflict, including actions that may not traditionally fall within established definitions of war crimes. The legal framework of this tribunal could draw upon existing international treaties as well as customary international law principles. It is imperative that the tribunal establishes clear definitions regarding acts of ecocide, potentially drawing upon historical precedents such as the Nuremberg Trials to delineate culpability for state-sponsored violence. Ukraine has sought international support in its quest for accountability. Collaborating with organizations such as Stop Ecocide International, Ukraine aims to develop a definition for ecocide that aligns with international legal standards.
In December of 2024, Ukraine was not a State Party to the Rome Statute; however, it has submitted two ad hoc declarations under Article 12(3) accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Article 12(3) permits a non-party state to confer jurisdiction upon the Court for specific situations or periods, thereby allowing the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes that occurred within that state’s territory or were committed by its nationals. These ad hoc declarations are significant because they allow the ICC to extend its reach beyond member states, thereby allowing for accountability in situations where serious international crimes may have been committed. The declarations are usually limited in scope, specifying particular incidents or timeframes for which the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction. This means that while the state does not fully accept all provisions of the Rome Statute, it is willing to cooperate with the ICC on certain matters.
Ukraine’s engagement with the ICC began through two ad hoc declarations submitted over a decade ago, under Article 13(2) of the Rome Statute. The first declaration Ukraine made was on February 20, 2014, which coincided with the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The second declaration that Ukraine lodged with the ICC was on September 8, 2015, extending its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes occurring on Ukrainian territory from that date onward without a specified end date. However, it’s important to note that these declarations did not impose any binding obligations on the state regarding cooperation with the ICC. The effectiveness of this mechanism relies completely on the political will of the state to cooperate with the court’s proceedings and investigations.
ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan announced the opening of a formal investigation into the situation in Ukraine on February 28, 2022, following referrals from 39 state parties. The investigation is grounded in alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, with jurisdiction limited to crimes committed on the territory of ICC member states or by their nationals. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has deployed personnel to Ukraine and established a country office to coordinate Ukrainian and international justice efforts. However, while the ICC can investigate acts causing harm to civilians, it does not currently recognize environmental destruction as a standalone offense. The investigation only considers these environmental impacts insofar as they directly harm civilians or violate the laws of war, highlighting a legal gap where the ICC lacks the foundation to deliberately prosecute environmental destruction as an independent crime.
This evolving relationship between Ukraine and the ICC reached a turning point on January 1, 2025, when Ukraine formally acceded to the Rome Statute, transitioning from provisional cooperation to full State Party status and reinforcing its long-term commitment to international criminal accountability. As a member state, Ukraine can now advocate for the inclusion of ecocide as a core international crime under the Rome Statute, a move that could expand the ICC’s mandate to address environmental destruction in conflict. Establishing mechanisms to prosecute such crimes will require strategic diplomacy, coordination with legal bodies, and sustained political support. If successful, Ukraine’s efforts could serve as a precedent in international criminal law, shaping how the global community responds to conflicts that involve both human and environmental harm.
Edited by Blanka Gyorfi-Toth (Barnard College '26) and Jay Jacobson (Columbia University School of General Studies ‘28)